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Introduction 
This paper examines the emergence of the International Organization for 
Standardization as global governor in the area of international product and systems 
standardization. We outline a novel theoretical approach rooted in the theory of clubs 
(Cornes and Sandler, 1996; Prakash and Potoski, 2006) that analytically connects 
governors as institutions with governance. Unlike much of the regime literature, which 
tends to focus on governance systems established to mitigate international governance 
failures, the Global Governors project focuses on actors who establish, monitor, and 
enforce these rules. After all, given the lack of a global sovereign, it is not clear which 
actors govern at the international level, how, and to what consequences. While we 
illustrate our approach in the context of a non-governmental governor, the International 
Organization for Standardization, and a specific governance system it has created, ISO 
14001, our perspective is sufficiently general to be employed to study inter-governmental 
governors as well hybrid governors – an important issue given that we seldom find policy 
monopolies in most policy domains.  
Governors are actors that supply governance services or rule systems to organize 
collective endeavors. They establish rules, monitor compliance with these rules, and/or 
supply enforcement and sanctioning services.  In this chapter, we explore (1) how the 
design of governance systems is endogenous to the attributes of the governor and (2) how 
this affects the ability of the governance system to address the twin challenges of 
recruitment (attracting participants) and shirking (ensuring that the participant’s adhere to 
the system’s requirements).  Our inquiry therefore how governance systems can fail and 
how they can be successful. Our club theory approach should therefore help in comparing 
  - 2 -non-governmental governors across policy domains, as well as comparing governance 
systems sponsored by different governors within a given domain, along analytic 
dimensions such as institutional emergence, functioning, and effectiveness. 
For analytical clarity, we term the actors that establish governance systems as the 
primary governors and actors performing monitoring, enforcement, and sanctioning as 
secondary governors, in recognition of the fact that the entire gamut of governance 
activities need not be performed by the same actors.  In some cases, the primary governor 
may “outsource” monitoring, enforcement, and sanctioning to others.
1 In other cases, 
outside actors may themselves step in to monitor and enforce the rules without 
necessarily seeking permission from the primary governor. While some of this division of 
governance between the primary and secondary governors might follow Williamson’s 
(1985) “make or buy” logic, non-economic logics might be at work as well. The key 
point is that the array of governance services need not be provided by a single, 
hierarchically organized governor. Instead, we should think in terms varying 
configurations of the governance chains (akin to a supply chain or a value chain), the key 
governors in such networks, and what factors might drive such variations.  
Our paper and more broadly, the Global Governors project, speaks to the broader 
debate on the relative salience of agency and structure in influencing individual and 
collective behaviors. It takes the agency-structure debate beyond its usual dichotomies 
because it emphasizes the role of structurally embedded agents in supplying new (and 
different) structures of global governance. Agents work in an institutional environment 
                                                 
1 This issue can be examined via the perspective of agency theory, as we have done 
elsewhere. 
 
  - 3 -where some extant structures have important bearings on their preferences and normative 
proclivities. In addition, agents often themselves create institutions to constrain their own 
behaviors as well as of others. The question then is what drives the supply and 
configuration of these institutions? As our paper illustrates, the supply of new governance 
structures is influenced not only by the collective action confronting agents, or the 
demands that various stakeholders make on them in response to governance deficits, but 
also the institutional space afforded to agents by existing structures.  
As a global governor, the International Organization for Standardization supplies 
product
2 and process standards to commercial actors.
3  Later we will show how these 
standards can be viewed as clubs.  Standards are “specifications and criteria to be applied 
consistently in the classification of materials, the manufacture of products and the 
provision of services... (they) provide a reference framework, or a common technological 
language, between suppliers and their customers - which facilitates trade and the transfer 
                                                 
2 Also see the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy on the politics and 
economics of international institutional standards, 2001, Volume 8, Issue 3. 
 
3 For illustrative purposes only, here is an example of an ISO technical standard. ISO 
5151 specifies the standards for testing and rating performance of Non-ducted air 
conditioners and heat pumps. This 43 page standard was created by Technical Committee 
#86. This standard: 
 
Specifies the standard conditions on which the ratings of single-package and split-
system non-ducted air conditioners employing air- and water-cooled condensers are 
based, and the test methods to be applied for determination of the various ratings. Is 
limited to systems utilizing a single refrigeration circuit and having one evaporator 
and one condenser. Also specifies the test conditions and the corresponding test 
procedures for determining various performance characteristics of these non-ducted 
air conditioners and heat pumps 
(http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=111
56&ICS1=27&ICS2=80&ICS3=&scopelist=, accessed 01/19/2007. 
 
  - 4 -of technology.”
4 Of course, the International Organization for Standardization is not the 
only governor in the international standardization sector; others include the IEC 
(International Electrotechnical Commission, see Tim Buthe’s chapter in this volume) and 
the ITU (International Telecommunication Union).
5   
Since its inception in 1947, the International Organization for Standardization has 
developed over 16,000 international standards (or clubs), most of which are technical 
product standards. Its website notes: 
When the large majority of products or services in a particular business or 
industry sector conform to International Standards, a state of industry-
wide standardization can be said to exist. This is achieved through 
consensus agreements between national delegations representing all the 
economic stakeholders concerned - suppliers, users, government 
regulators and other interest groups, such as consumers. They agree on 
specifications and criteria to be applied consistently in the classification of 
materials, in the manufacture and supply of products, in testing and 
analysis, in terminology and in the provision of services. In this way, 
International Standards provide a reference framework, or a common 
technological language, between suppliers and their customers - which 
facilitates trade and the transfer of technology (ISO 2007a). 
 
Starting in the 1980s, the International Organization for Standardization expanded 
its governance offerings to include process and management system standards in the 
fields of quality control (ISO 9000), the environment (ISO 14001), and food safety (ISO 
                                                 
4 http://www.iso.org/iso/en/faqs/faq-general.html, accessed 01/19/2007.  
 
5 All three governors are based in Geneva. To coordinate their activities, they have 
formed the World Standards Cooperation, a kind of a supra-governor. Unlike the IEC and 
the ITU, the International Organization for Standardization’s focus is not limited to any 
particular sector: it is the key cross-sectoral governor in the field of international 
standardization.  http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html; accessed 
01/19/2007. 
 
  - 5 -22000). Recently, it has begun developing corporate social responsibility standards (ISO 
26000).
6
Our discussion of the International Organization for Standardization focuses 
specifically on one of its clubs, ISO 14001, the most widely adopted voluntary 
environmental standard in the world. As of 2005, 110,000 facilities from 138 countries 
have received ISO 14001 certification to become what we call club members. While ISO 
9000 was the International Organization for Standardization’s first process standard, it 
has not generated much controversy because its key stakeholders ---  firms, NGOs and 
governments ---  tend to have converging preferences on quality issues. Quality control is 
predominantly a technical rather than a political issue with distinctive regulatory, 
distributive, or redistributive dimensions (Lowi, 1964). Indeed, there are strident debates 
about whether governments should retain a governance monopoly in the environmental 
area because non-governmental governors may not have incentives to create effective and 
democratic governance systems. By and large, activist groups are more concerned with 
and agitated about clubs (such as ISO 14001) designed to mitigate the Pigouvian 
externality problems (Pigou, 1960) and less with clubs designed to mitigate coordination 
problems (as in ISO 9000) (Abbot and Snidal, 2001).
7 Given these important political 
dynamics, ISO 14001 is an interesting illustrative example through to explore the politics 
and economics of global governorship and governance.  
                                                 
6 It has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations to ensure 
that this standard coheres with the United Nation’s Global Compact, another global 
governor in the area of corporate social responsibility 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/commcentre/pressreleases/2007/Ref1062.html; accessed 
07/30/2007. 
 
7 This is not to say that coordination problems are bereft of distributional conflicts; they 
are not. The controversy over the technical standards of High Definition TV is a case in 
point (Hart, 2004). 
  - 6 -Following this volume’s themes, by governance we mean the organization of 
collective action through a set of rule structures, also termed as institutions or regimes. 
Creating institutions is often expensive.
8 Actors tend to establish institutions where 
collective endeavors are expected to be enduring rather than one-off affairs. By 
permitting, prohibiting, or prescribing actors’ behaviors (Ostrom, 1990), institutions 
stabilize expectations about other actors involved in the collective endeavor. Because 
institutions can and do fail, institutional effectiveness --- their abilities to shape actors’ 
behaviors in desired ways --- should be viewed as a variable that needs to be examined 
rather than as one whose value can be assumed.   
While institutions are expected to alter the incentives facing any actor, they also 
inculcate or “teach” norms (Finnemore, 1996) about appropriate and inappropriate 
actions – which can then alter actors’ future incentives. Different institutions are likely to 
employ varying strategies, which are embedded in the sometimes competing and 
sometimes reinforcing logics of instrumentality and appropriateness (March and Olson, 
1989).  While the International Organization for Standardization tends to employ 
instrumental rationales to encourage firms to adopt ISO 14001, the logic of 
appropriateness is often embedded in its communication strategies. Instead of 
apportioning the variance between these logics, a task that is almost impossible, we 
                                                 
8 While some institutions might spontaneously emerge (Sugden, 1989), a substantial 
proportion of policy relevant institutions are conscious artifacts of human agency. Indeed, 
while establishing new institutions, actors take into account and are constrained by 
existing institutions (Thelen, 1999). Our theoretical narrative takes into account historical 
institutional legacies by emphasizing the varying institutional contexts in which actors 
and the institutions they create or join function. A key point our research has made is that 
non-governmental clubs operate in the shadow of public regulation (much of which is a 
carry over from the past) and their efficacy is influenced by their fit with public 
institutions. 
  - 7 -examine the institutional design behind this governor’s quest to create and communicate 
the usefulness of this unique governance “product” and therefore encourage firms to 
voluntarily join ISO 14001. 
9
Non-governmental programs, sometimes also described as private authority 
regimes, are recognized as important policy tool across countries, industries, and issue 
areas (Cutler et al., 1997, Haufler, 2001; Mattli and Buthe, 2003; Cashore et al., 2003; 
Prakash and Potoski, 2006). They seek to create institutional incentives for participating 
actors (typically targeting firms, but also NGOs
10 or even governments) to adopt specific 
codes of conduct and practices beyond what is legally required of them. The governors of 
voluntary regulatory programs claim that such programs encourage program participants 
to create positive social externalities, although in practice this expectation is not always 
met.  If the claims are justified, the creation of such externalities is a direct consequence 
of program participants’ beyond-compliance practices. Some social externalities might 
have the attributes of public goods, such as a cleaner environment, while some others 
may have more private goods characteristics, such as higher wages. Different types of 
externalities create incentives for different stakeholders to organize in favor of or against 
a voluntary program, and thereby influence the propensities of actors to join the program.  
The challenge for a governor sponsoring a voluntary program is to motivate firms 
to pay the costs of producing a broader social good. Why would a firm, or any 
                                                 
9 The epistemic community perspective is also inadequate for this task because it 
downplays the instrumental motives of participating actors. While actors participating in 
the ISO’s governance and rule making processes certainly have technical expertise, 
standard development is fundamentally a political process where instrumental concerns 
of actors often play an important role. This is particularly evident in the development of 
standards to govern environmental issues. 
 
10 See Gugerty (2008) in the context of NGO clubs. 
  - 8 -instrumental actor for that matter, voluntarily do so? Voluntary programs offer monetary 
and non-monetary payoffs for producing social externalities that participants would not 
capture as cheaply without participating in the program. An apparel company, for 
example, might join a fair labor practices program to enhance its brand image and escape 
criticism from social activists (Bartley, 2008).  For the stakeholders, these programs 
reduce information asymmetries regarding firm’s unobservable practices, such as whether 
the firm is employing child labor. By participating in a credible voluntary program, firms 
can signal their intentions and practices along dimensions that are difficult for external 
stakeholders to observe, and therefore lower stakeholders’ transaction costs for 
identifying “progressive” firms. Stakeholders can reward the participants or punish the 
non-participants as they deem fit, depending on their own preferences and abilities. 
An important analytic challenge is to understand how the program governors 
create and communicate the meaning and value of participation in their voluntary 
program, its “brand” image, because it this brand identity that entices firms to join the 
program and thereby produce positive externalities.   
 
Global Governors and Governance: A Club Theory Perspective 
Social dilemmas pertain to situations in which actions by self-interested 
individual does not improve the welfare of the larger group. A well known example is the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma game where two prisoners kept in different cells “confess” in the 
hope of securing lenient sentences for themselves although it would have been better for 
both prisoners to “ not confess.”  At a more fundamental level, collective action 
  - 9 -dilemmas can be traced to the attributes of goods and services and the institutional 
context in which actors seek to produce, exchange, and consume them.  
Two attributes are especially important: excludability and rivalry. Excludability 
means that it is technologically, institutionally, and economically feasible for one actor to 
exclude others from appropriating the benefits of a good.  The actor wants to exclude 
because it has contributed resources for the production, maintenance, or protection of the 
good while others have not. An absence of excludability creates incentives for other 
actors to “free ride”, that is, to enjoy the good’s benefits without contributing to its 
production, maintenance, or protection (Olson, 1965).  After all, on average, why would 
actors incur costs if they cannot be prevented from appropriating a good’s benefits? 
Rivalry (or subtractability) means that if one actor consumes a particular unit of a 
good, it is no longer available for another actor to consume. Rivalry in consumption can 
create incentives for actors to over-consume resources – the logic being, if I do not 
consume it, them somebody else will, and therefore deny me the benefits from future 
consumption. Over-consumption by several actors can lead to resource degradation, such 
as what occurs in the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). If rivalrous resources are 
excludable, their scarcity would lead to higher prices, thereby lowering consumption. 
Problems arise when rivalrous goods are non-excludable because their scarcity does not 
translate into higher prices that curb consumption.  
Based on these characteristics, products can be classified into four stylized 
categories: private goods (rival, excludable), public goods (non-rival, non-excludable), 
common-pool resources or CPRs (rival, non-excludable), and impure public goods (non-
rival, excludable). Private goods can generally be produced and exchanged through 
  - 10 -markets without significant collective action problems. In other words, when individuals 
produce, buy and sell private goods, they not only make themselves better off, they also 
improve the lots of those with whom they are exchanging resources. Such rosy win-win 
scenarios are less likely to occur in the cases of public goods, clubs goods, and common 
pool resources. For public goods and common pool resources, non-excludability is an 
obvious source of collective action problems. Not surprisingly then, the production of 
positive externalities creates collective action problems: individuals are not willing pay 
the private costs of producing externalities that others cannot be excluded from enjoying 
(but see Coase, 1960). The net benefit of these externalities, the value their producer and 
everyone else enjoys, may be much greater than their costs, but since the producer 
experiences only a fraction of the benefit and all the costs, she is not likely to produce 
them.  Such market failures are often the rationale underlying government market 
interventions via command and control regulations: because firms are likely to over 
produce negative externalities and under produce positive ones, governments enact 
regulations that compel actors in socially desirably directions.  
Voluntary governance clubs can also mitigate collective action dilemmas and 
therefore induce participating firms to incur private costs to produce positive 
externalities. In the economic sense of the term, clubs are institutions that supply impure 
public goods (Tiebout, 1956; and Wiseman, 1957). James Buchanan (1965) identified 
clubs as institutions for producing and allocating goods that are neither fully private 
(rivalrous and excludable), nor fully public (non-rivalrous, non-excludable). Club theory 
has been applied to examine policy issues pertaining to zoning, busing, road congestion, 
city size, and military alliances (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). 
  - 11 -Where voluntary programs differ from traditional clubs is that their purpose is to 
produce social externalities and they use branding benefits that have the characteristics of 
club goods to induce social behavior. Clubs create externalities by requiring members to 
incur private costs, as codified in the club’s membership standards and their mechanisms 
for ensuring compliance with those standards. Unlike the traditional Buchanan Club, the 
main costs in voluntary programs are not direct payments to club sponsors. Rather, they 
are the monetary and non-monetary costs of adopting and adhering to the club’s 
requirements.  
Clubs generate three kinds of benefits: social externalities, private benefits, and 
branding benefits. Social externalities constitute the policy payoff of voluntary programs. 
Club’s positive externalities can have the attributes of private goods (a club requiring 
participating firms to pay higher wages), public goods (a club requiring participating 
firms to lower air pollution) or even club goods (a club requiring participating forestry 
firm not to cut trees which are revered by an aboriginal group).   
Private benefits accrue to a single member only. They do accrue neither to the 
club members nor to nonmembers.  For example, a voluntary program designed to protect 
the environment might require policies that help firms to identify waste and therefore 
reduce costs and improve profits. Such private benefits, however, have limited utility for 
evaluating voluntary programs because an instrumental actor (such as a profit-oriented 
firm) is likely to take these actions unilaterally, without joining the club, in order to enjoy 
the private benefits such actions produce. If the private gain from unilaterally taking such 
action were sufficient, then voluntary clubs would not be necessary to produce the social 
externalities we desire.  
  - 12 -Club benefits, the central analytical feature of voluntary programs, accrue to club 
members only and are key incentives for joining the club. They are something valuable 
that club sponsors can offer to participants and exclude non-participants from 
appropriating them.  Club benefits manifest as goodwill, reputation or other 
compensation that members receive from external stakeholders in response to their club 
membership. Club members often receive a branding that enables them to advertise that 
they are different from non-members by virtue of their club participation. Because 
stakeholders have different preferences regarding the externalities they want firms to 
produce, and have varying abilities to reward or punish firms, the stakeholder context in 
which firms are located crucially bears upon the branding benefits firms perceive from 
joining the club. 
The issue of optimal club size has been widely discussed in economics literature. 
Although our voluntary program notion of a club differs from a traditional Buchanan 
club, club size is equally germane in our case.
11  Indeed, the size of a club’s membership 
roster influences the value of its branding benefits in important ways. While voluntary 
clubs might be susceptible to overcrowding, by and large, voluntary clubs have been 
challenged to attract sufficiently large rosters. Additional members create positive 
network effects (Bessen and Saloner, 1988), that is, the branding benefits participants 
derive increase when a new firm joins the club because additional members help 
advertise a club more broadly as one member’s activities generate positive reputational 
                                                 
11 For a formal model of the implications of voluntary program size, see Kotchen and 
Van 't Veld (2007). 
 
  - 13 -spillovers for others.
 12
Some firms unilaterally take actions to boost their reputation with stakeholders. If 
such unilateral action is effective, why should firms join voluntary clubs? Club 
membership offers several advantages over unilateral action for enhancing firms’ 
reputations among stakeholders. From the stakeholders’ perspective, unilateral 
commitments by firms to socially desirable action are less credible. When individual 
firms make and enforce their own rules, they can more easily change them. Because they 
are institutionalized systems (and rules are often sticky) and if they consciously separate 
membership from control, clubs can enjoy a degree of credibility that firms alone may 
find difficult to acquire. Because clubs can also capture economies of scale and network 
externalities, progressive actions taken as part of a club can do more to boost a firm’s 
standing with stakeholders than the same action taken unilaterally.  
We have suggested that by separating membership from control, clubs may seek 
to signal to stakeholders that the club is not a sham but instead imposes serious beyond-
compliance requirements on its participants. But stakeholders also need to be assured that 
over time the governors (club sponsors) will not dilute their club’s standards, a plausible 
scenario if the club is sponsored by an industry association or by an actor that tends to 
favor business interests. To satisfy the skeptics, club governors need to credibly commit 
to not opportunistically lowering standards. The attributes of the club governors can 
affect the nature of credible commitment challenges.  
                                                 
12 This issue should be examined in future research given the heterogeneity among firms. 
Arguably, an additional firm with identical characteristics may not help in getting the 
message across to new stakeholders. Perhaps, the club sponsors should seek to attract 
diverse array of firms each with links in different stakeholder networks. Our future work 
will investigate how organizational reputations are created and advertised. 
  - 14 -Consider two types of governors: pro-business and anti-business. When a club is 
sponsored by a pro-business governor, it needs to signal to its stakeholders that it will not 
opportunistically loosen the rules. When a club is sponsored by an anti-business 
governor, the credible commitment challenge is in relation to its potential members: 
governors need to make a credible commitment that they will not opportunistically 
tighten the rules. Think of a scenario when firms consider joining an NGO-sponsored 
club. Potential members recognize that exiting a voluntary club might be costly; club 
membership might require them to acquire competencies or establish systems (in short, 
invest in assets) specific to the club but are difficult to apply to alternative uses 
(Williamson, 1986). Thus, such asset specificity might make them vulnerable to 
opportunistic exploitation by the governor.
13  
The second issue is the potential retribution costs. For firms, membership in a 
voluntary club provides an intangible asset in the form of branding benefits. By joining a 
voluntary club, firms make a public commitment to pursue socially progressive practices. 
If they exit, they are likely to be spotted and perhaps sanctioned by stakeholders. In fact, 
club governors have incentives to advertise the exit and shame the exiting firm. 
Anticipating the structural predicament potential participants face, club governors might 
be tempted to opportunistically raise the stringency of their club’s requirements over 
time. Potential members who recognize the incentive incompatibility problem may 
therefore want a credible commitment from club governors that they will not exploit their 
                                                 
13 Arguably, in the long run, such governors would not be able to attract new members. 
Hence, they might not have incentives to behave opportunistically. As our field work in 
this area for over a decade suggests, these assurances are not likely to persuade managers 
in “staff” functions who are often planning how to survive the next round of corporate 
downsizing. 
  
  - 15 -advantage. Thus, in many ways, club design and club governance is endogenous to the 
attributes and reputations of club governors. 
Mere words to assuage potential members’ concerns may not suffice to solve 
credible commitment problems: potential members may want safeguards in the rule 
making processes (such as a super majority to change standards) and perhaps 
representation of countervailing interests on the rulemaking bodies. Thus, whether the 
club is sponsored by governors sympathetic to business interests or hostile to them, club 
design must respond to credible commitment issues.
14
 
Mitigating Collective Action Dilemmas  
  Like any other governance mechanism, clubs are vulnerable to institutional 
failures if they do not solve their collective action dilemmas. For voluntary clubs, two 
collective action dilemmas are analytically most salient. First, what we term the Olsonian 
dilemma, centers on a club’s capacity to attract participants to its roster, and to capture 
the economies of scale and network effects for building club’s reputation. Second, what 
we term as the shirking dilemma, pertains to a club’s ability to compel participants to 
adhere to its program standards once they joined the club. Participants might have 
incentives to free ride on the club’s reputation: they could join the program and enjoy the 
benefits of its reputation, but shirk their responsibility to adhere to its standards. 
Widespread shirking reduces production of positive social externalities and therefore 
undermines clubs’ credibility and viability. If the club strictly monitors rules and 
                                                 
14 While do not have space to illustrate this issue with an example, we wish to note that 
the dynamics in the forestry industry seem to support our predictions. The NGO-
sponsored club, Forest Stewardship Council and the industry-sponsored club, Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative, have implement changes in the rule making processes in response to 
credible commitment problems (Cashore et al., 2003). 
  - 16 -sanctions non-compliance, shirking can be mitigated. A club with a reputation for 
effectively policing its participants is likely to have a stronger standing among its 
stakeholders.   
 
Club standards 
Club standards specify what firms need to do to join the club and remain members 
in good standing. Club standards can come in different forms. They might specify 
performance expectations (sometimes called outcome standards). Other standards are 
more process oriented, such as requirements that members adopt a management system, 
or that members regularly consult with community groups.  Finally, some club standards 
limit membership eligibility by descriptive preconditions, such as whether firms operate 
in a specific industry or have already established high standards of social performance.  
Lenient club standards require marginal effort for the potential participants to join 
the program over and above the requirements of public law and regulations. They are 
low-cost clubs for firms to join. Of course, even lenient club standards must mandate at 
least some non-trivial membership costs, or else the club would be merely an empty 
gesture.  While many firms might easily join a lenient voluntary club, we expect its 
reputation is likely to be weak because word would spread among stakeholders that it 
makes only marginal demands on its participants and therefore requires them to produce 
little additional social externalities. We also expect such clubs to face adverse selection 
problems because firms with superior social performance would not want to subsidize or 
identify with laggards. In the long run, this would further lower a club’s credibility and 
make it unattractive even for laggards. It should be noted, however, that clubs designed to 
  - 17 -fool stakeholders exist (and preempt regulations) and scholars and policymakers should 
not take claims made by club governors for granted. Given the active scrutiny by activist 
groups of such clubs, they are likely to be exposed. Our theory predicts that, over the 
long haul, such “Astroturf” clubs
15 would have marginal membership and importantly, 
marginal impact on public policy. 
Stringent club standards require members to produce social externalities well in 
excess of what government laws require. Such actions are likely to be costly, although the 
nature of these costs varies across firms even operating in the same institutional settings. 
The advantage of stringent standards is that the club brand would be more credible and 
serve as a low cost tool for signaling club members’ commitment to the club’s social 
objective. Armed with this information, stakeholders could reward or punish firms 
accordingly.  
Designing voluntary clubs requires balancing competing imperatives. On the one 
hand, to enhance the club’s credibility with external stakeholders, sponsors may prefer 
stringent standards. On the other hand, such standards may lead to low membership --- 
and few network effects and scale economies in building the club brand --- as few firms 
are able to meet demanding membership requirements. Thus, pitching the club standards 
at a level so that they are appropriate for the potential participants and yet acceptable to 
key stakeholders is a key institutional design issue club governors must confront, a task 
that has been accomplished reasonably well by the International Organization for 
Standardization in the context of ISO 14001. 
 
                                                 
15 We owe this term to Henry Farrell. 
  - 18 -Monitoring and Enforcement Rules 
Shirking is a second major source of institutional failure for voluntary programs. 
Shirkers formally adopt the club’s standards but do not adhere to them. They nonetheless 
continue to claim to be socially progressive by virtue of their club membership. While 
clubs can exclude non-members from enjoying the benefits of club membership, shirkers 
slip by unless they are identified and expelled. If the word spreads about large scale 
shirking --- and it is difficult to keep such information under wraps --- the club’s 
reputation is likely to slip and its brand reputation weakened. Thus, club sponsors have 
incentives to curb shirking --- unless, of course, the club is an “Astroturf” club designed 
to fool stakeholders rather than impose real requirements on its members to create 
positive social externalities. 
Willful shirking occurs because: (1) the goals of the participants and the club 
governors diverge, and (2) participants are able to exploit information asymmetries 
(regarding their adherence to club standards) between themselves and club governors and 
stakeholders.
16  Eventually, information asymmetries prevent stakeholders from 
differentiating program shirkers from non-shirkers. As we discuss below, because 
measures to curb shirking impose costs on potential participants, club governors have to 
                                                 
16 Arguably, shirking might be inadvertent. While there might be goal convergence 
between participants and club sponsors, the participants may not correctly understand 
club requirements or possess means to adhere to them. While this is theoretically 
possible, we have not found examples in the context of management standards where 
clubs requirements are seldom in the form of complex, technical terms that some 
participants might not comprehend. Club requirements are often quite simple and 
straightforward. Hence, we expect that much of the shirking is likely to be willful. 
 
  - 19 -balance competing imperatives.
17
We identify three components to effective and credible monitoring and 
enforcement systems to mitigate information asymmetries and sanction the shirkers: 
third-party monitoring, public disclosure of audit information, and sanctioning by club 
governors. While club governors might themselves serve as monitors in most voluntary 
clubs designed to produce social externalities, third-party monitoring is the gold standard 
if not the norm (Gereffi et al., 2001). Third-party monitoring means that club governors 
require participating firms to have their club-related requirements or policies audited by 
accredited, external auditors to verify that they are adhering to membership requirements. 
Firms are less likely to shirk under third-party auditing because they recognize that 
accredited, external actors have the ability and incentive to identify and report shirking. 
In some cases, the governors may require public disclosure of audit information to 
empower external actors (secondary governors) to scrutinize participating firms’ club 
obligations and then expose the shirkers. Sanctioning by external stakeholders might 
follow, thereby mitigating club participants’ incentives to shirk in the first place. Finally, 
the governor may itself act upon the audit information and sanction the members that 
have been found to be shirking on their obligations. This might be a credible threat 
because the governors have a vested interest in ensuring the club’s credibility. However, 
at the same time, governors may not want to acquire a reputation of being harsh and 
adversarial. Anti-business governors, in particular, need to be careful about the level and 
type of sanctioning. Arguably, in such club, the governors may have a greater impact on 
                                                 
17 Shirking might be curbed by sociological pressures (normative, mimetic, and coercive) 
from other participating firms or stakeholders which in the first place persuade program 
members to join the club. Instead of relying on sociological pressures alone, a club can 
mitigate shirking through its institutional design.   
  - 20 -public policy if they retain firms with imperfect compliance with club regulations in the 
club as opposed to expelling them and thereby losing the leverage they exercised over 
firms’ policies by virtue of firms’ club membership. Thus, the design and practice of the 
monitoring and sanctioning rules is likely to be endogenous to the attributes of the club 
governors.  
We call clubs’ monitoring and enforcement programs “swords.” ‘Strong sword’ 
programs have all three components: audits, disclosure, and sanctioning mechanisms. 
While they are most likely to curb shirking because they mitigate information 
asymmetries between participants and governors/stakeholders and allow sponsors to 
sanction shirkers, for participants, they are high cost clubs. ‘Medium sword’ programs 
require third-party audits and public disclosure. Although their institutional design does 
not provide for sanctioning of the shirkers by the governor, they are likely to curb 
shirking because, with public disclosure of audit information, firm’s stakeholders can 
punish the shirkers. ‘Weak swords’ programs require only third-party audits. For the 
participants, they are low cost clubs in which information asymmetries between the 
governor and club members are sought to be mitigated by audits only. Because external 
stakeholders do not have access to information regarding adherence to club obligations 
by individual participants, they cannot reward or sanction firms.  As we discuss below, 
ISO 14001 is an example of a ‘weak sword’ club.  Its governor, the International 
Organization for Standardization, is not known to aggressively sanction shirkers and the 
absence of public disclosure of audit information weakens stakeholders’ ability to 
sanction shirking.   
  - 21 -To summarize, we expect voluntary programs to produce the most social 
externalities (measured in terms of members’ improvement in social performance of 
participating members beyond legal requirement) in clubs with stringent standards and 
strong swords. However, these are also high costs club that might discourage firms from 
joining them. We expect the production of social externalities to be small in clubs with 
lenient standards and weak swords. While these are low cost clubs, they are likely to 
create only marginal branding benefits for their participants. Given that political and 
economic implications of voluntary clubs vary across participants, governors, and 
stakeholders, different club types are likely to serve as the most appropriate fits for 
varying policy contexts. In some instance, policy makers might favor a lenient standards 
club with wide membership as opposed to a stringent standard club with a very limited 
membership. We expect heterogeneity of clubs in various policy environments instead of 
the domination of one specific type. 
 
ISO as a Global Governor and ISO 14001 as a Governance Club 
The International Organization for Standardization is a non-governmental 
governor established in response to functional demands for standardizing technical 
standards and processes. It is made up of representatives from 158 national standards 
bodies. These national bodies, in turn, are agents of the various stakeholders of their 
country; they are not official representatives of their countries’ governments. Some of 
these representatives might be governmental bodies (as in Standardization Administration 
of China) while others have non-governmental status (as in American National Standards 
Institute). The International Organization for Standardization was not established via an 
  - 22 -inter-governmental treaty. It is a non-governmental governor in which governmental 
bodies in their individual capacities scan serve as principals.   
  While the International Organization for Standardization has launched about 
16,000 clubs, we explore its environmental management club, ISO 14001. This club 
prescribes the broad principles for firms’ environmental management systems and does 
not mandate environmental standards for firms’ products or technologies. Further, it does 
not stipulate environmental outcomes firms must achieve. The rationale for focusing on 
management standards is that if appropriate systems are in place, desired outcomes will 
follow. Firms that wish to join ISO 14001 must establish a written environmental policy 
that the senior management approves, establish systems, document compliance, regularly 
review their progress, and designate a top manager to oversee implementation of the 
firms’ environmental programs. In practice, ISO 14001 typically commits member firms 
not only to comply or exceed domestic laws, but also to adopt the best available 
environmental technologies, assess the environmental impact of their operations, and 
establish programs to train their personnel in environmental management systems.
18 For 
most firms, the management systems are extensive. They require substantial investments 
in personnel, training, and most critically, in establishing paper documentation for their 
environmental operations (Sayre, 1996).  
  Unlike some other voluntary environmental programs, ISO 14001 requires 
participants to receive an initial certification audit, conducted by certified external 
auditors who themselves are audited and approved by their domestic national standards 
body. Firms must then receive annual recertification audits to verify that their 
                                                 
18 http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/index.html; accessed 01/27/2006 
 
  - 23 -management systems continue to meet ISO 14001’s standards (ISO, 2005b). These audit 
and certification measures are designed to prevent participants from shirking their 
program responsibilities as ISO 14001 members (Kolk, 2000).  
While not conclusive, recent research suggests that ISO 14001 certification 
improves firms’ environmental and regulatory performance.  In a study of 236 Mexican 
firms in the food, chemical, nonmetallic minerals and metal industries (which together 
generate 75 to 95 percent of Mexico’s industrial pollution), Dasgupta et al. (2000) find 
that ISO 14001 adopters show superior compliance with government environmental 
regulations. This is important because developing country governments often find it 
difficult to enforce their own regulations. Instead of undermining public regulation, ISO 
14001 may improve firms’ compliance with them, even when firms are located in alleged 
pollution havens.  Echoing Dasgupta et al.(2000), in an analysis of over 3,000 US 
facilities, Potoski and Prakash (2006) find that ISO 14001 certification improves 
regulatory compliance among US facilities regulated under the Clean Air Act.  There is 
also evidence that firms joining ISO 14001 also pollute less.  In an analysis of 316 U.S. 
electronics facilities, Russo (2001) finds that ISO 14001 membership is associated with 
decreased toxic emissions. Potoski and Prakash (2006) report that ISO 14001 adopters 
reduce pollution as reported in the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory. In sum, while ISO 
14001 alone will not solve all industrial pollution problems, there is some evidence that 
ISO 14001 adoption leads to lower facility-level pollution and improved facility-level 
compliance with public law.   
 
A Very Brief History of International Organization of Standardization 
  - 24 -In 1906, the International Electrotechnical Commission was founded to develop 
technological standards for the burgeoning electronics industry (for details on the IEC, 
please see Tim Buthe’s chapter in this volume). In 1926, the International Federation of 
the National Standardizing Associations (IFNSA) was established to develop standards in 
the field of mechanical engineering. IFNSA was fairly active in Europe through the 
1930s, although it became dormant with the onset of the Second World War. 
Nevertheless, business interest in establishing common international standards did not 
fade away. The United Nations Standards Coordination Committee (UNSCC) was 
established in 1946 to aid allied war efforts and subsequent reconstruction. In 1946, 
delegates from 25 countries met to discuss merging the IFNSA and UNSCC, leading to 
the creation of the International Organization for Standardization in 1947 (ISO, 2004a).  
Effective and widely accepted international clubs facilitate international trade by 
reducing the transaction costs inherent in negotiating contracts. The identification and 
agreement on the International Organization for Standardization as a governor to develop 
global clubs helped mitigate coordination dilemmas inherent in multiple standards. The 
challenge was to bestow this governor with sufficient technical expertise and legitimacy 
so that the clubs would be viewed as authoritative across countries.  This governor 
benefits from the widespread norm that businesses should reduce transaction costs 
stemming from cross-national variations in government regulations. As the argument 
goes, businesses are increasingly global and should be allowed to manage their global 
operations with minimum friction or bureaucratic interference. Clubs created by the 
International Organization for Standardization provide one route for accomplishing this 
end. They enable multinational corporations to reduce the transaction costs of dealing 
  - 25 -with varying clubs across their subsidiaries and with their trading partners.  However, we 
recognize that such global clubs might also be motivated by the business’ desire to 
preempt the emergence of new national level regulations and standards – an important 
issue that undermines this governor’s legitimacy among some stakeholders (Prakash and 
Potoski, 2006).  
International Organization for Standardization’s legitimacy also stems from its 
technical expertise and its participatory process for developing new standards. While the 
clubs it creates serve business interests, non-governmental organizations can be included 
in the national delegations and therefore can (and do) participate in the rule making 
processes which takes place via technical committees. It is fair to say that given the 
transparent and bureaucratic nature of its rule-making processes, the International 
Organization for Standardization has been able to credibly commit that its clubs will not 
opportunistically and surreptitiously dilute their requirements in the future. It has, 
however, not committed to creating a level playing field between business and 
nongovernmental actors in the rule making processes, especially in the context of more 
politically sensitive clubs such as ISO 14001. As a consequence, key environmental 
organizations remain skeptical of ISO 14001 and some of them even oppose it.  
This has political consequences and erodes the credibility of this club in some 
contexts. For example, the active opposition from environmental groups has led the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency to disallow attorney-client privilege for 
the environmental audits which are essential for securing the ISO 14001 certification. Not 
surprisingly, American firms are relatively wary of joining ISO 14001 lest the 
environmental audits uncover environmental violations, thereby creating evidence for the 
  - 26 -EPA to use it against them (Kollman and Prakash, 2001). Indeed, at the country-level, the 
United States is one of the few laggards within the OECD world regarding ISO 14001 
adoption. 
Rule Making 
The International Organization for Standardization creates and modifies clubs 
(which once established are open to any firm or country can adopt it) based on specific 
procedures and voting rules, all directed towards making its working participatory. It 
assigns voting rights according to three types of membership type: 103 member bodies, 
46 correspondent members, and 9 subscriber members.
19 Only member bodies can be 
considered as principals because they have full voting rights and are entitled to 
participate in any technical committee responsible for developing standards. Others can 
be termed as quasi principals because while they are kept informed about the work in 
done in the technical committees, they do not have voting rights.
20 (ISO, 2004b).  
Every year, the International Organization for Standardization convenes a meeting 
of its General Assembly to vote on various proposed standards, with each full member 
receiving one vote. Proposals are submitted to the General Assembly by the ISO Council, 
which serves as the executive committee for the organization. Representation on the ISO 
Council rotates every three years among full members. The Council itself does not 
develop the proposed clubs. Instead, it forms ad hoc technical committees to develop 
specific standardization clubs and then disbands them once the clubs’ rules are in place. 
Technical committee members represent specific countries. Typically, those on the 
                                                 
19 http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers/index.html
 
20 http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers/index.html 
  - 27 -committee members are technical experts on loan from industry, technical bodies, or 
governmental agencies. Although NGOs (or trade associations) do not have an 
independent standing in the International Organization for Standardization, they can 
serve on technical committees as a part of a national delegation. To retain voting rights in 
technical committees, the International Organization for Standardization requires that 
members regularly attend the meetings. Absence from two consecutive meetings can 
trigger punitive action.  To approve a new standard, the International Organization for 
Standardization requires a two-thirds majority approval in the technical committee and a 
three fourths majority in the General Assembly. It reviews and if necessary revises each 
club at least every five years (ISO, 2004b). 
Along with rule making, governors need to monitor compliance and sanction non-
compliance. How does the International Organization for Standardization approach rule 
monitoring and enforcement? To explore this, we briefly contrast the World Trade 
Organization (WTO, an inter-governmental governor) with the International Organization 
for Standardization (a non-governmental governor), both charged with promoting world 
trade.
21 Institutionally, the WTO has club like features --- its benefits are excludable and 
non-rival. It seeks to govern the policies of governments, not firms, and it supplies rules 
that restrain governments from erecting tariff and non-tariff barriers and provides 
grievances settlement services. The WTO has outsourced the monitoring function to 
                                                 
21 Activist groups routinely criticize the WTO for not providing them a “voice” during 
the trade negotiations. They contrast this with the United Nations that solicits the views 
of non-governmental actors. The World Trade Organization, however, has made an 
exception for the International Organization for Standardization by granting it an 
observer status, arguably because of the close convergence in the objectives of the two 
governors. This can be viewed as an additional proof of the pro-business bias of the 
International Organization for Standardization. 
  - 28 -member countries (secondary governors) which have incentives to monitor their 
competitors’ behaviors. To minimize monitoring costs, the WTO’s institutional logic 
favors a “fire alarm” approach over a “police patrol” approach (McCubbins and 
Schwartz, 1984). If country A believes that country B has imposed import restrictions in 
violation of WTO rules, it can file a complaint with the WTO. The WTO offers 
adjudication services and decides on the merits of the complaint. Interestingly, the WTO 
does not provide sanctioning services. It decides the level of retaliation that the plaintiff 
is allowed and it is up to the plaintiff to enact specific policies in this regard.  
Unlike the World Trade Organization, the International Organization for 
Standardization promotes trade by supplying international voluntary clubs for reducing 
trading costs among countries. The ISO 14001 club extends the International 
Organization for Standardization’s transaction cost reducing logic in a new way.  It seeks 
to reduce transaction costs stemming from information asymmetries between firms and 
their stakeholders regarding firms’ unobservable internal environmental practices. Firms 
that join ISO 14001 must adopt an environmental management system for their internal 
operations, as codified in the ISO 14001 standards. By requiring firms to adopt beyond-
compliance environmental management practices, ISO 14001 certification signals to 
stakeholders that firms have adopted environmentally responsible policies which lead 
participating firms to create positive environmental externalities. Thus, stakeholders are 
able to differentiate environmental leaders from laggards at low costs, and depending on 
their preferences, can reward or punish participating firms. To compensate for the non-
trivial costs of adopting environmental management systems, ISO 14001 provides 
branding benefits so that firms can advertise to stakeholders that they are ISO 14001 
  - 29 -certified.  The payoff perceived by potential participants from this brand signal is 
contingent on ISO 14001’s institutional design as well as firms’ characteristics and the 
stakeholder and the institutional context in which firms operate.  
In the case of ISO 14001, the International Organization for Standardization does 
not provide monitoring services or enforcement services. These services are provided by 
third-party auditors (secondary governors) who are accredited by national-level 
accreditation bodies. While the International Organization for Standardization has the 
authority to sanction participating firms that shirk on their program obligations by 
revoking their ISO 14001 certifications, this is seldom exercised. Because it does not 
require participating firms to disclose audit information, it is a ‘weak sword’ club that has 
a relatively high likelihood of shirking. On both these counts, the ISO 14001 has been 
criticized by activist group. Given that ISO 14001 has attracted a large number of firms, 
and that its requirements have been criticized as insufficient, we expect that the club 
governors will come under a lot of pressure to ratchet up the club requirements. While 
changing such rules is not easy, it is not impossible. It will be very interesting to see how 
the governor responds to such demands in the future. On one hand, it needs to shed its 
pro-business image to gainer a wider acceptability and legitimacy. However, by 
becoming a strong sword club, it might create disincentives for firms to join it. This is a 
non-trivial concern because it faces competition from several industry-level 
environmental clubs. 
Competition 
There is seldom a single governor or a single club in a policy domain. How do 
firms decide which one(s) to join? Do clubs have first-mover advantages in terms of 
  - 30 -attracting members? These advantages might be substantial given the propensity among 
firms to join any club depends in large measure on the “network effects” they can capture 
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1985). This is because the benefits for a firm joining the club 
critically depend on how many other firms have adopted it as well. In the context of 
technical clubs, the International Organization for Standardization does not face much 
competition, especially given the market division agreed upon with the IEC and the ITU. 
In this role, by providing a focal point for standard development, this governor mitigates 
coordination dilemmas facing firms.
22 The widespread acceptance of technical standards 
is aided by the fact that new ISO rules need to be approved by a super majority of 
national delegations (which often include representatives from leading, national firms). 
Once firms commanding a substantial global market share in an industry subscribe to ISO 
standards --- which they do because industrialized countries are the active members in the 
rule making processes --- the emergence of a rival club becomes less feasible. Thus, a 
participatory and consensus-based standard making process helps the International 
Organization for Standardization to secure its place as the preeminent global 
standardization governor. 
Unlike technical standard clubs, there is competition among governors, each 
offering their own clubs, within the context of management standards clubs such as ISO 
9000 and ISO 14001. The International Organization for Standardization’s foray into 
management standards clubs has created interesting competition dynamics. While its first 
management standard, the ISO 9000 quality control program, has been widely adopted, 
its adoption levels vary across countries even after controlling for the usual suspects such 
                                                 
22 See Spruyt (2001) in the context of demand and supply of standards. 
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competing quality standard clubs such as the Six Sigma, as well industry-specific 
standards established by industry associations. 
ISO 14001 faces an even more intense competition. Even if we were to think of a 
restricted domain for ISO 14001 – voluntary environmental clubs – we can identify 
several governors that supply competing clubs: (1) industry-level governors, such as the 
American Chemistry Association’s the Responsible Care club and the American Forestry 
and Paper Association’s the Sustainable Forestry Initiative club, (2) regional governors, 
such as the European Union’s EMAS club and (3) governmental governors, such as the 
EPA which have supplied more than 60 clubs such as the Performance Track initiative. 
Many of the competing clubs are targeted at specific industries and arguably 
provide more compelling branding benefits for the firms simply because the stakeholders 
can identify the club with the industry type. Further, ISO 14001 faces competition from 
regional clubs, which again can provide more compelling branding benefits, and 
government-sponsored clubs which, in many cases, can provide tangible benefits in the 
short run. In short, the competition for membership in the voluntary environmental 
governance policy market is substantial.  
Firms can surely join multiple clubs at the same time but this increases their costs. 
An important challenge for the International Organization for Standardization is to make 
ISO 14001 standards appeal across industries and countries. While ISO 14001’s 
standards are indeed generic and apply across industries and regulatory contexts, this 
flexibility has come at the cost of specificity, with some environmentalists criticizing its 
lack of transparency. Some of the competing clubs have stronger credibility because they 
  - 32 -either have more stringent and specific club standards or monitoring rules. The crucial 
challenge for the governor is to identify how potential participants make trade-offs 
between the increased credibility (and the branding benefits that result from it) flowing 
from stringent rules and the higher costs of joining such clubs. In the case of ISO 14001 
the International Organization for Standardization seems to be have opted for a ‘weak 
sword’ club with moderate club standards. It will be instructive to observe how this 
governor responds to the activist pressure to upgrade the quality of ‘swords’ and club 
standards.   
Who Governs? 
Many view the International Organization for Standardization as a pro-business 
governor. Recognizing this perception, our theory predicts that club governors would 
respond to this in the design of their various clubs. To respond to the credible 
commitment problem, the International Organization for Standardization works with 
specific voting rules. Standards need to be approved by two-thirds of the members that 
have participated in the standards development process, and by three fourth of all voting 
members.
23 Thus, the standards cannot be changed easily. In any case, the process of 
standard development is reasonably transparent and outside observers, even when not 
represented on technical committees, have a fair amount of information about the 
deliberations.  
Nevertheless, the International Organization for Standardization’s rule making 
processes are criticized as unjust and inequitable. While the procedures may serve the 
interests of the principals, the clubs can create negative externalities for non-principals. 
                                                 
23 http://www.iso.org/iso/en/stdsdevelopment/whowhenhow/how.html 
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independent standing, which often leaves them on the outside of the standards 
development process. This is unlike much public regulation in democracies, particularly 
in the US, where NGO’s deliver input through established institutional mechanisms. 
Second, the costs of participating in the standards development meetings and the 
difficulty in supplying technical experts tend to exclude participation by national 
standards bodies from developing countries, leaving some principals structurally 
disenfranchised (Clapp, 1998). Consequently, although developing countries account for 
about 75 percent of the national standards bodies in the International Organization for 
Standardization, they contribute less than 5 percent to the technical rule-making work. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (another global governor) 
has consequently recommended that the ISO provide financial support to developing 
countries to facilitate their participation in standards development. Despite these 
criticisms, the International Organization for Standardization continues to maintain its 
central position, arguably because it enjoys credibility for its technical expertise and its 
relatively open and fair rule standards development processes. 
In addition to the rule making issues, one can also examine the “who governs” 
issue by exploring the factors that drive the diffusion of ISO 14001. Arguably, at both the 
rule making and diffusion levels, developed countries seem to be most privileged. Our 
empirical work suggests that important drivers of ISO 14001 adoption lie in the structure 
of the international political economy. Recall that we made the argument that in addition 
to club design and the attributes of the club governors, the attractiveness of the club 
depends on the institutional and stakeholder context in which potential participants are 
  - 34 -located. A given club may have varying levels of credibility (and therefore branding 
benefits) in different contexts. Our research suggests that exports and inward foreign 
investment are important drivers of ISO 14001 adoption. Specifically, we find that 
international trade serves as a vehicle for transmitting importing countries’ ISO 14001 
preferences to exporting countries (Prakash and Potoski, 2006b). Given that developed 
countries (with the exception of the United States) with high levels of ISO 14001 
adoption absorb the bulk of developing country exports, international trade has 
encouraged ISO 14001 adoption in developing countries through a supply chain 
requirement. For many developing country firms, ISO 14001 certification has become an 
important requirement for exporting to developing countries. In another paper, we find 
that inward foreign investment stocks are associated with higher levels of ISO 14001 
adoptions in host countries when foreign investment originates from home countries that 
themselves have high levels of ISO 14001 adoptions (Prakash and Potoski, 2007). In 
other words, countries’ ISO 14001 adoption levels are associated not with how much FDI 
host countries receive but from whom they receive it. In this way, the value of the ISO 
14001 brand becomes contingent on the value attached to it by their foreign investors. 
Thus, a careful study of ISO 14001’s cross-national diffusion reveals how the structural 
power enjoyed by some principals in the rule making processes has enhanced their ability 
to exploit their structural power in international trade and investment to encourage the 
diffusion of ISO 14001 club. Whether such “weak swords” clubs are the most appropriate 
for the developing world remains to be seen. As it stands now, ISO 14001 is becoming a 
de facto requirement to tap into trading and investment networks that the key principals 
of the International Organization for Standardization seem to dominate.  
  - 35 - 
Conclusion 
The proliferation of non-governmental governors supplying voluntary clubs raises 
important questions about their efficacy as policy tools. These clubs vary in their ability 
to shape actor behavior and their policy usefulness has been called into question. While 
they are not a panacea, prematurely rejecting non-governmental clubs might miss an 
important opportunity to strengthen global governance. However, uncritically accepting 
them might strengthen the structural inequities in the world. 
We have provided the initial steps for a theoretical framework for evaluating 
voluntary clubs on two crucial dimensions --- club standards and enforcement rules --- to 
guide inquiry into a better sense of the promise and pitfalls of different categories of 
these clubs.  Through the theoretical lenses of club theory, we seek to explain how club 
attributes can induce members to produce positive social externalities and contribute to 
overall welfare. We examined how these attributes can mitigate the Olsonian dilemma of 
inducing members to join the club and the shirking dilemma of having members adhere 
to club standards once they have joined.   
Our perspective suggests important directions for further study. Although this 
paper has focused on how club standards and enforcement rules affect clubs’ collective 
action dilemmas, other club dimensions are likely to influence club efficacy. As our 
discussion of the International Organization for Standardization has shown, the reputation 
of the governor and the processes for establishing club rules are likely to influence the 
club’s credibility among members’ stakeholders. Clubs sponsored by governors that have 
recognized for their expertise are likely to be perceived as more legitimate and effective. 
  - 36 -The ISO 14001 club benefits from the International Organization for Standardization’s 
reputation as a global standards authority, not just for technical standards but increasingly 
for management standards as reflected in its successful ISO 9000 program. Likewise, 
transparent and inclusive rule-making procedures can improve a voluntary program’s 
credibility. The International Organization for Standardization’s rulemaking process for 
ISO 14001 involved actors from many sectors and from around the world. However, the 
NGOs and developing countries can be better represented. 
This club theory perspective on governance has profound potential for advancing 
scholarly inquiry.  We believe that club theory offers powerful insights for studying the 
production, provision, and distribution of collective goods through mandatory (e.g., 
governments) as well as voluntary clubs. Often times, scholars insist that voluntary 
programs are fundamentally different from public regulation and need a different theory 
of governance. We submit that public regulation can be viewed as a mandatory club. It is 
mandatory because any actor living in its jurisdiction is obliged to obey club rules. 
Monitoring and enforcement issues suggest that individuals often have considerable de 
facto (not de jure) autonomy in responding to governmental law. At a broader level, 
whether actors in a mandatory club have credible exit options might be debatable; 
mandatory clubs require strictly defined boundary conditions to keep insiders in and to let 
only selected outsiders in. But boundaries can be porous -- firms and labor can vote with 
their feet (Tiebout, 1956; Hirschman, 1970). In fact, much like voluntary clubs, the 
boundary conditions of mandatory clubs (as reflected in free trade agreements and 
immigration laws) are not fixed; regulations for the inflow and the outflow of capital and 
labor are often subjects of heated public debates. Inter-governmental clubs also reflect 
  - 37 -similar debates about boundary conditions, membership rules, and broader collective 
goods issues. Thus, in several ways mandatory clubs share with their voluntary cousins 
similar issues about institutional design and the production and distribution of collective 
goods.  Indeed, several scholars have employed the club perceptive to study 
intergovernmental clubs such as the European Union (Ahrens et al., 2005), The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (Sandler and Hartley, 1999), the World Trade Organization 
(Keohane and Nye, 2001), and regional trading blocs (Fratianni and Pattison, 2002). 
Thus, the club approach can help identify the key characteristics of governance systems, 
link them to the attributes of the governors, and move towards a general theory of 
governance.  Our paper contributes to this endeavor.  
In sum, non-governmental governors have the potential to serve as important 
global governance instruments. They are neither a panacea, nor a curse, but they can 
certainly compliment the efforts of existing global, inter-governmental governors. They 
merit careful examination to understand their operations so that policy decisions can 
harness their potential and avoid their pitfalls.   
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